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SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF
THE PRESS©
By CHRISTIE A. MCNEILL*

In the companion cases of CanadianBroadcastingCorp.
v. Lessard and CanadianBroadcastingCorp. v. New
Brunswick (AG.), the Supreme Court of Canada
decided that the media should not have any special
protection from police search and seizure above that
afforded to ordinary citizens. In refusing to create a
standard of heightened constitutional protection to be
met before a search warrant can be issued against the
press, the Court turned a blind eye to its past
interpretations of section 8 of the Charteras containing
a standard of reasonableness that varies depending
upon the context of the search and the particular rights
involved. These decisions ignore the unique role that
the media play in a democratic society and will
continue to have a negative impact on the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press. It
appears that a better balance of the interests of the
press and of law enforcement can only be reached
through legislative intervention.

Dans les cas pendants de cBc c.Lessard et cac c.
Nouveau-Brunswick (P.-G.),Ia Cour supreme du
Canada a d6cid6 que les m6dias ne doivent pas avoir
des protections sp6ciales contre les fouilles, les
perquisitions ou les saisies abusives, au-delh de celles
qui sont accord6es aux citoyens ordinaires. En rejetant
la cr6ation d'un standard plus 6lev6 de protection
constitutionnelle A satisfaire avant de pouvoir donner
un mandat contre la presse, la Cour n'a tenu aucun
compte de ses interpr6tations ant6rieures de i'article 8
de la Charte comme comprenant un standard de ce qui
est raisonnable qui est variable selon le contexte des
fouilles, des perquisitions et des saisies, et les droits
particuliers qui s'y impliquent. Ces d6cisions ne
prennent pas en consideration It r6le unique des
mddias dans une soci6t6 d6mocratique, et erles
continueront A avoir un impact ndgatif sur les garanties
constitutionnelles de la libert6 de la presse. II paralt
qu'un meilleur 6quilibre des intr8ts de la presse et de
I'activit6 polici~re ne peut 8tre accompli que par
l'intervention 16gislative.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"PoliceRansackNewspaper Offices-Supreme Court of CanadaBulldozes
OverFreedom of the Press."
This could very well have been the front page headline of a
newspaper after the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its
decisions in Canadian BroadcastingCorp. v. Lessard1 and Canadian
BroadcastingCorp. v. New Brunswick (A.G.).2 In these companion cases,
Canada's highest court decided that the media, as innocent custodians of
information relating to a crime in which the press itself is not an
implicated party, do not have any special protection from police search
and seizure above that afforded to ordinary citizens. What the Court
failed to adequately acknowledge, however, is that organs of the media
are not ordinary citizens. The press plays a unique and vital role in our
society and should be provided with special protection. Instead of
acknowledging this, the Supreme Court decided that section 8 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms3-which protects every
person's right to be secure against unreasonable search or
seizure-applies in the same fashion to the press as it does to other
individuals, and that section 2(b)-which protects freedom of the
press-offers the press no protection from search and seizure beyond
that provided to all individuals by section 8.
1 [1991] 3 S.C.R. 421 [hereinafter Lessard].
2 [1991] 3 S.C.R. 459 [hereinafterNew Brunswick].
3 Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
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In this article, I argue that the Court should have considered
more carefully the special interests and relationships involved in
searches of the press and should have set out a specific regime to
provide more protection to the press. Given the Court's decisions,
however, the only realistic hope that exists to combat this erosion of
freedom of the press in Canada is a legislative response, setting out a
rule of heightened protection for the media against police search and
seizure.
1I. THE PRESENT LAW
In Lessard4 and New Brunswick,5 the Canadian Broadcasting

Corporation (cBc) possessed video footage that was created at the
scenes of incidents believed to involve criminal activities. In Lessard, a
camera crew filmed a group of people vandalizing a post office in
Pointe-Claire, Quebec. In New Brunswick, CBC filmed demonstrators
setting fire to a company guardhouse during the course of a labour
dispute at a pulp and paper mill. In each case the police executed search
warrants to seize the video footage of the incidents in an effort to secure
the identity of those responsible for the criminal acts.
After the searches had been executed, CBC brought an
application to quash the search warrants claiming that the press is
entitled to heightened protection under section 8 of the Charter. More
specifically, cBc argued that, in order to obtain a search warrant against
the press, the police must not only satisfy the criteria set out in section
487 of the Criminal Code,6 but must also show that there are no
alternative sources from which the information sought could be obtained
or, if alternative sources do exist, that they have been fully investigated.
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, however, refused to
create a new standard that would ensure that the press would receive
heightened protection from police search and seizure.
This approach is entirely consistent with the approach of the
United States Supreme Court in Zurcherv. The Stanford Daily.7 In that
case, a student newspaper, which had published articles and photographs
of a clash between demonstrators and the police at a hospital brought an
4 Supra note 1.
5 Supra note 2.
6 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter CriminalCode].
7436 U.S. 547 (1978) [hereinafter Zurcher].
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action claiming that issuing a search warrant against a press office based
on the same criteria that apply when issuing a search warrant against
members of the general public deprives the press of its constitutional
right under the First Amendment.8 The Court held that, as long as the
ordinary preconditions to be met before a search warrant can be issued
(i.e., probable cause, reasonableness, and specificity with respect to the
place to be searched and
the items to be seized) are applied with
"particular exactitude" 9 when First Amendment interests would be
endangered by the search, the constitutional rights of the press would be
adequately protected.
III. THE HUNTER REGIME
By not creating a constitutionally higher standard to be met
before a search warrant can be issued against the press, the Supreme
Court of Canada turned a blind eye to the approach that it had
established several years earlier with regard to section 8 of the Charter.
In the past, the Court had interpreted section 8 as containing a standard
of reasonableness that varies depending on the context of the search and
the particular interests involved. In the seminal case of Hunter v.
Southam Inc., Dickson J.(as he then was) stated:
Where the state's interest is not simply law enforcement, as, for instance, where state
security is involved, or where the individual's interest is not simply his expectation of
privacy, as, for instance, when the search threatens his bodily integrity, the relevant
standard might well be a different one.1 0

The Supreme Court of Canada continued in this vein in several
cases subseqent to Hunter. In Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada
(Directorof Investigation and Research), La Forest J. stated that "[t]he
degree of privacy the citizen can reasonably expect may vary significantly
depending upon the activity that brings him or her into contact with the
state." 11 In McKinlay TransportLtd. v. R., Wilson J. stated that, "[s]ince
individuals have different expectations of privacy in different contexts

8 U.S. Const. amend. I states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."
9

Zurcher,supra note 7 at 565.
10 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 168 [hereinafter Hunter].
11 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425 at 506 [hereinafter Thomson Newspapers].
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and with regard to different kinds of information and documents, it
follows that the standard of review of what is 'reasonable' in a given
context must be flexible if it is to be realistic and meaningful. 1 2 And, in
referring to a lower court's treatment of section 8, in a case about a
statutory provision requiring the mandatory production of individuals'
health records by the Alberta Human Rights Commission, she
commented that "[t]he rationale for this [differing standard] was that
what is reasonable 'depends upon consideration of what is sought, from
13
whom, for what purpose, by whom and in what circumstances."'
Finally, in Desc6teaux v. Mierzwinski, the Supreme Court stated that
"there are places for which an authorization to search should generally
necessary, with more
be granted only with reticence and, where
14
places."
other
for
than
attached
conditions
These cases suggest that the threshold standard to be met before
a search warrant can be issued may be heightened or lowered depending
on the circumstances and the interests, especially the privacy interests,
that the individual is likely to have in those circumstances. In other
words, the protection that section 8 provides at the issuance stage is
contingent on context. Therefore, a closer look at the interests involved
and the specific context of a search of the press is required.
IV. THE INTERESTS INVOLVED
Analysis of section 8, like all sections of the Charter,involves a
balancing of competing interests. Accordingly, "[t]here is no ready test
for determining the reasonableness of a search other than by balancing
15
the need to search against the invasion which the search entails."
Regarding searches of the press, there are several interests to be
balanced. First, the main purpose of section 8 is to "protect individuals
from unjustified state intrusions upon their [reasonable expectation of]
privacy." 16 The press, as an entity, has an expectation of privacy that
must be protected in order for the institution to carry out its functions.
12 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627 at 645 [hereinafter McKinlay Transport].
13

1bid. at 646, citing Alberta Human Rights Commission v.Alberta Blue Cross Plan (1983), 48
A.R. 192 at 195 (CA.).
14 [1982] 1 S.C.R. 860 at 889 [hereinafter DescOteaux].
15 R.S. Schiffrin, "Search and Seizure in the Newsroom-Constitutional Implications for the

First and Fourth Amendments-Zurcher v. The Stanford Dail/' (1978) 28 De Paul L. Rev. 123 at
130, citing Camarav. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 at 536-37 (1967).
16

Hunter,supra note 10 at 160.
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Without privacy, the freedom provided to the press in section 2(b) of the
Charterto gather, analyze, and disseminate news would be meaningless.
In addition, the individual employees and reporters are also entitled to
have their privacy protected from unreasonable intrusions under section
8. They enjoy constitutionally protected expectations of privacy
regarding their press files, press facilities, and personal files. This
protection is especially important given the fact that
[p]eople who work in offices think of their own offices as personal space in a manner
somewhat akin to the way in which they view their homes, and act accordingly.... Indeed,
an office may actually be more private than the home in so far as one's relations with
family are concerned. Whatever the reason, it is a fact that in an office one is likely to
find personal letters, private telephone and
address directories, and many other
17
indicators of the personal life of its occupant.

Searches of the press are also typically "third party" searches.
This means that the press and its employees are not suspected of
criminal activity, but are merely in possession of information that might
aid the police in their investigation. It is arguable that innocent third
parties should have greater protection of their privacy interests under
section 8 than suspects should. This issue will be discussed in more
depth in Part VI, below. The privacy interests of confidential sources
who have provided the press with information must also be taken into
account when conducting a balancing of interests under section 8.
Another important interest involved in the situation found in
Lessard and New Brunswick is the freedom of the press. Section 2(b) of
the Charter states that everyone has the "freedom of thought, belief,
opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media
of communication." The press requires this freedom in order to provide
a vehicle for individual expression, and to inform and educate the public
by offering criticism and a forum for debate and discussion. Freedom of
the press is "vital to the functioning of our democracy ... premised on

the free reporting and interchange of ideas."18 In fact, "freedom to
persuade, cultivate, entreat and convince by means of various media of
expression [is] one of the essential conditions of a democratic
government"1 9 because "the maintenance of a democratic society is

17 Thomson Newspapers,supra note 11 at 521-22 [emphasis in original].
18

Lessard,supra note 1 at 451.

19 SJ. Whitley, CriminalJustice and the Constitution (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at 139.
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dependant upon the existence of a well-informed public, which, 20in turn,
depends upon the preservation of a free and independent press."
The press fulfills its role in society by gathering, editing, and
distributing information.2 1 If the police are given license to roam
through press offices, the freedom that the press requires to carry out
these constitutionally protected functions 22 is endangered in several
ways. First, it will become more difficult for the press to gather
information, because reporters may begin refusing to make written or
permanent records for fear that they will be seized by police.23 This may
also affect the accuracy of the material reported and will prevent future
reference to written accounts being made by reporters involved in
similar stories. Additionally, if it becomes evident that police can easily
search and seize materials of the press, confidential sources will cease to
come forward because there is no guarantee that they will remain
confidential. 4 A reporter's promise of confidentiality becomes
meaningless and ineffectual in the face of a police officer armed with a
search warrant that entitles him or her to look through the entire
contents of the press office without prior warning. The press may also
lose opportunities to cover various events because of the participants'
25
fears that press files will be readily available to the police.
The internal editing operations of the press may also be "chilled"
if police are permitted to search press offices. 26 If editorial deliberations
become the possible object of public scrutiny, editors will not feel free to
make decisions and may alter their policies. Similarly, the press may
resort to self-censorship 2 7 to protect its sources and avoid police
searches. For example, editors might decide not to print a story or
photograph so that the police will not become aware that the news
organization has information conveying a given event. To avoid a
search, the press will simply keep the information to itself.
20 J.J. Durney Jr., "Search Warrants and the Press: Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily" (1979) 8
Cap. U. L. Rev. 595 at 595.
21 J.S. Liebman, "Search and Seizure of the Media: A Statutory, Fourth Amendment and First
Amendment Analysis" (1976) 28 Stan. L. Rev. 957 at 973.
22

Lessard,supra note 1 at 429-30.

231kid. at 452, wherein McLachlin J.lists the six main ways in which a search of the press may
impinge on freedom of the press.
24 Ibid.

25 Ib
26 Ibid
27Ibid
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The dissemination of information to the public will not only be
affected by a tendency to self-censor by the press, but will also be
impeded because searches are physically disruptive and can affect the
timely and efficient publication of the information. 28 In addition, by
retaining seized materials the police may prevent, or at least delay, the
press from relaying that material to the public.2 9
It can also be argued that providing access by police to the files
30
of the press may give rise to doubts as to the impartiality of the press.
One commentator has remarked: "If the press is informally and
involuntarily impressed into the service of law enforcement agencies as a
subsidiary fact gathering agent, it will lose its credibility as being the
independent eye and ear of the citizenry."31 The function of the press is
to report the news in an independent and unbiased fashion. If the press
is seen as favouring law enforcement, however unwillingly, by helping
the police gather information, it will lose its credibility-which is
acquired on the basis of the press's perceived independence. To protect
its impartiality, "the press must not become a source of information
which saves police officers from doing their investigation work."32
The potential harm to the section 8 privacy rights and the section
2(b) press freedoms must, however, be balanced against the legitimate
interests of the state in investigating, prosecuting, and preventing crime.
It is now widely accepted that "[t]he Charter does not intend a
transformation of our legal system or the paralysis of law
enforcement." 33 Accordingly, any rule that disproportionately favours
the interests of the individual being searched at the expense of the state's
interest in effective law enforcement cannot be accepted. Searches and
seizures give the state access to evidence that is required to lay charges
and to prosecute and convict criminals. If the judicial system did not
have a way of compelling the production of necessary evidence through
searches- and seizures, law enforcement could be hamstrung in two
respects. First, searches are often a key element at the investigatory
28
Ibid
291bid&

30 La Societi Radio-Canadav. Lessard [1989] R.J.Q. 2043 at 2049 (C.A.) [hereinafter RadioCanada].
31 C.L. Cantrell, "Zurcher: Third Party Searches and Freedom of the Press" (1978) 62 Marq.
L.Rev. 35 at 48.
32
Radio-Canada,supranote 30 at 2049, Jacques J.A.
33
M. Mandel, The CharterofRights and the Legalizationof Politicsin Canada (Toronto: Wall
& Thompson, 1989) at 131.
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stage of the process. The search itself often produces evidence that
enables the police to identify suspects of a crime. Without the search,
suspects may not be identified and criminals will remain at large.
Second, the state requires evidence at the trial in order to convict a
suspect. Without the evidence obtained during a search, a guilty
individual might be acquitted and released into society where he or she
may continue to commit crimes.
It is important not to totally immunize the press from police
searches because journalists are involved in investigatory processes of
their own and often come upon evidence of criminal activity that may be
unavailable to law enforcement. Although the Supreme Court has
concluded "the press should not be turned into an investigative arm of
the police,"3 4 if the press does happen upon some critical evidence, it
should not be permitted to unquestionably withhold this information
from the police. It is also significant to note that if the press was
completely immunized from police searches, criminals might begin
"stashing" evidence relating to their crimes in press offices. This could
happen if the press was sympathetic to the criminal and his or her cause
or possibly without the knowledge of the press.3 5
The interests of one other group-the public-must be taken
into consideration when balancing the interests involved in searches of
the press. The public's interests, however, fall on both sides of the
equation. The public has an interest in freedom of the press, for it has a
right to know and be informed about events in a democratic society. It
also has an interest in fighting and preventing crime. It is for the sake of
the public that the courts must carefully balance the needs of the state to
search press offices and the needs of the press to be free from
governmental intrusions.
V. CONTEXT: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE PRESS AND THE POLICE
The competing interests involved in searches of the press are not
the only factors that should be taken into consideration when deciding
upon a standard of reasonableness under section 8 of the Charter.
Another important factor is the relationship between the police and the
press. Even the most perfunctory review of social science literature

34

Lessard, supra note 1 at 432.

35

Liebman, supranote 21 at 999.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 34 NO.

I

reveals that "there is always tension between the police and the press"36
and that "the relationship has traditionally been a hostile one, chilled by
conflicts which inhibit the flow of information that the public has both
the right and the need to know."'3 7 This finding appears counterintuitive since a symbiotic relationship could be considered most
beneficial-to the press, which needs information from the police to
write stories, to the police, who need access to the public in order to
capture criminals by relaying descriptions of suspects and crimes, and to
the public, who need confidence in the abilities of both. In addition,
studies have established that the police and the press have a great deal in
common. They both strive toward the goals of "good environment,
'3 8
justice, public confidence, and equal treatment of all citizens."
Similarly, both are powerful, visible institutions that take pride in
ingenuity, individual effort, and investigative skills, and rely on
anonymous sources and secretive methods to collect information 3 9
Despite the striking similarities and (apparent) common goals,
the relationship that has developed between the press and the police is
40
often one of "a very basic mistrust and perhaps even mutual dislike."
In fact, psychological studies have cited the relationship as one of the
primary examples of profession-induced anxiety. 4 1 Police officers
complain that the press deliberately portrays law enforcement in a poor
light, sacrificing truth in favour of sensationalism. 42 The press, on the
other hand, feels that police officers deliberately shut it off from sources
of information in an attempt to impede its information gathering
function. 43
This battlefield is the context in which the Supreme Court of
Canada had to decide if the press should be entitled to heightened
protection from police searches above that afforded to ordinary citizens.

36 M. Kiernan, "Police vs. the Press: There is Always Tension" in P.A. Kelly, ed., Police and
the Media:Bridging Troubled Waters (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1987) 65 at 66 [hereinafter
"Always Tension"].
37

P.A. Kelly, "Police and The Media: Debunking The Myths" in Kelly, ed.,supra note 36, 127
[hereinafter "Debunking The Myths"].
38 D.M. Mozee, "Police/Media Conflict" in Kelly, ed., supra note 36, 141 [hereinafter
"Conflict"].
39 "Always Tension," supra note 36 at 67.
40 GAV. Garner, The PoliceMeet the Press (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1984) at 4.
41 "Debunking the Myths," supranote 37 at 127.
42 Ibid. at 128.
43 "Conflict," supra note 38 at 142 and 148.
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The Court, however, never mentioned the hostile underpinnings of the
relationship. This is an unfortunate oversight because the antagonistic
relationship strengthens the argument that the press needs greater
protection than other individuals under section 8. Letting the police,
with their apparent dislike for the press, into media offices armed with
search warrants will likely have the same consequences as letting the
proverbial fox into the chicken coop. Although one may argue that a
search warrant clearly delineates what the police may search and seize,
and thus controls the behaviour of the police, there is "simply no
conceivable way to search for a few documents in a room filled with
many, without doing precisely that." 44 There is really nothing to prevent
ransacking and searching of irrelevant material other than an application
to quash the warrant, which would be made after the search and seizure
has taken place and, consequently, after the damage to the privacy and
freedom of the press has already occurred. In the long term, easy access
by the police to the files of the press will only serve to accentuate the
antagonism and "may put the press in a situation of perpetual conflict
with the police officers." 45
VI. THE HUNTER REGIME REVISITED
The section 8 regime set in place by the Supreme Court of
Canada in cases such as Hunter,46 Thomson Newspapers,47 and McKinlay
Transport48 establishes that the standard of reasonableness can be
heightened where the interest of the individual being searched is "not
simply his or her expectation of privacy" 49 or where the context and
circumstances give rise to a high expectation of privacy. Section 8,
according to the Court, is not a monolith to be applied the same way in
all contexts.
Searches of the press involve interests other than simply the
privacy interest of the individual being searched. The constitutionally
protected freedom of the press is also at stake when media offices are
searched. Surely Dickson J. (as he then was) in Hunter would have
44 Schiffrin, supra note 15 at 136.
45
46
47

Radio-Canada,supranote 30 at 2049.
Supra note 10.
Supra note 11.

48 Supra note 12.

49 Hunter,supranote 10 at 168.
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considered this a sufficiently important interest to warrant creating a
different standard of protection under section 8.
In addition, the degree of privacy that the press can reasonably
expect may be higher than that of an ordinary citizen. The press is
merely an innocent custodian of information that it has collected as part
of its role to gather, edit, and disseminate news to the public. This role
could not be fulfilled without privacy from undue governmental
interference and is protected under section 2(b) of the Charter. Thus, to
borrow La Forest J.'s analysis in Thomson Newspapers,5 0 the activity that
brings the press into contact with the state is the constitutionally
protected activity of gathering news for the purpose of disseminating it
to the public. Surely this activity creates a higher expectation of privacy
than many other activities that are performed by ordinary citizens.
Additionally, no court should ever interpret one section of the Charter
(i.e., section 8) in a way that infringes upon another section (Le., section
2(b)). Freedom of the press would be meaningless without a high
degree of privacy to protect it.
In Lessard,51 the majority of the Court did pay lip-service to the
regime set out in Hunter, stating that "the media are entitled to
particularly careful consideration as to the issuance of a search warrant
- because of the importance of its role in a democratic society,"5 2 but it
did not provide any substantial protection for the press above that which
is provided to every citizen.
A. Cory J.s Nine Factors
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada went further than
the United States Supreme Court's requirement of "particular
exactitude" 5 3 in applying the test of whether a search warrant should
issue against the press. Cory J. set out nine factors that a justice of the
peace should take into consideration before deciding to exercise his or
her discretion to issue a search warrant against the press. The factors
are as follows:
1. It is essential that all the requirements set out in section 487(1)(b) of the Criminal

Code for the issuance of a search warrant be met.

50

Supra note 11 at 506.

51 Supra note 1.
52

Ibid at 444, Cory J.

53

Zurcher,supra note 7 at 565.
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2. Once the statutory conditions have been met, the justice of the peace should consider
all of the circumstances in determining whether to exercise his or her discretion to issue a
warrant.
3. The justice of the peace should ensure that a balance is struck between the competing
interests of the state in the investigation and prosecution of crimes and the right to
privacy of the media in the course of their news gathering and news dissemination.
Generally speaking, the news media will not be implicated in the crime under
investigation. They are truly an innocent third party. This is a particularly important
factor to be considered in attempting to strike an appropriate balance, including the
consideration of imposing conditions on that warrant.
4. The affidavit in support of the application must contain sufficient detail to enable the
justice of the peace to properly exercise his or her discretion as to the issuance of a search
warrant.
5. Although it is not a constitutional requirement, the affidavit material should ordinarily
disclose whether there are alternative sources from which the information may
reasonably be obtained and, if there is an alternative source, that it has been investigated
and all reasonable efforts to obtain the information have been exhausted.
6. If the information sought has been disseminated by the media in whole or in part, this
will be a factor which will favourthe issuing of the search warrant.
7. If a justice of the peace determines that a warrant should be issued for the search of
media premises, consideration should then be given to the imposition of some conditions
on its implementation, so that the media organization will not be unduly impeded in the
publishing or dissemination of the news.
8. If, subsequent to the issuing of a search warrant, it comes to light [that] the authorities
failed to disclose pertinent information that could well have affected the decision to issue
the warrant, this may result in a finding that the warrant was invalid.
9. Similarly, if the search itself is unreasonably conducted, this may render the search
invalid.5 4

While this approach is somewhat preferable to that taken in the
United States because it sets out specific items that a justice of the peace
should consider and thereby provides some guidance, it does not give a
higher standard of protection to the press for several reasons.
First, a justice of the peace is not bound to "find" that all nine of
Cory J.'s factors are present, but is merely required to "consider" the
factors in the exercise of his or her discretion. The factors do not set
down any solid rule or definitive guidelines and, accordingly, the results
in each case will differ depending on the particular views of the issuing
justice of the peace. One justice of the peace could merely turn his or
her mind to the fact that very few of Cory J.'s factors are present and
issue the warrant regardless, whereas another might refuse to issue a
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warrant unless all factors are present. The result is inadequate and
inconsistent protection of the press's interests.
The danger that the justice of the peace may not give sufficient
weight and protection to the interests of the press is especially high given
the exparte nature of search warrant applications. A justice of the peace
only hears and assesses input from the perspective of the police and "it is
inconceivable that the police would or could carefully explain the
newspaper's constitutional objections."'5 5 The system of warrant
issuance, therefore, becomes biased in favour of the interests of law
enforcement: "[b]y stating that the newspaper's objections are not
needed, the Court has assured a process that will consistently work in
56
favour of law enforcement."
Justices of the peace are also "often people in whose decisionmaking the legal system reposes less confidence, given their limited
responsibility and authority."157 Given this state of affairs, it is odd that
Cory J.would entrust cases concerning a conflict between section 2(b)
and section 8 values, which the Court itself has great difficulty balancing,
to justices of the peace. Cory J.is wrong to assume that justices of the
peace will be able to balance these important interests based solely on
sparse information contained in papers "normally drafted by nonlawyers [i.e., police officers] in the haste of criminal investigations"58
without the adversarial input of the press and without definitive
guidelines from the Court.
In addition, justices of the peace work closely with the police and
"are likely to have a symbiotic rather than a supervisory relationship with
the police."5 9 There is, indeed, substantial evidence to support the
contention that justices of the peace are often not acting as neutral and
impartial arbitrators. The Law Reform Commission of Canada 6 stated
that 58.9 per cent of all search warrants issued are issued invalidly. The
invalidity stems not from a lack of reasonable grounds to believe that
evidence will be found at a given location, but from a lack of compliance
with legal and constitutional requirements in the supporting paperwork
55
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Law Reform Commission of Canada, Police Powers-Searchand Seizure in CriminalLaw
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of the police.61 This paperwork (ie., the Information sworn by the
police officer) is generally the only ground on which a justice of the
peace issues a warrant. Instead of slapping police officers' wrists for
their slipshod approach to the process, justices of the peace condone
such methods by issuing warrants based on insufficient evidence.
Additional evidence of the collusive relationship between justices
of the peace and police officers is the number of warrants certain justices
of the peace actually refuse to issue. In the case of R v. Baylis,62 the
justice of the peace in question had not denied a single application for a
search warrant in two-and-a-half years. In fact, police officers who were
refused warrants by other justices of the peace came to realize that they
could then go to that justice of the peace and be granted the warrant.
The court found that this justice of the peace was not acting in a bona
fide judicial capacity. Baylis illustrates the potential danger of giving
justices of the peace the unfettered discretion to decide if the police
should be permitted to invade press offices.
Another significant problem with simply providing a justice of
the peace with a list of factors to consider is proving that he or she did
actually consider these factors. In R. v. Moran, the Ontario Court of
Appeal stated: "[i]t is clear that judges are not compellable to testify as
to their mental processes or how they reached a decision in a case before
them ... [and] this rule is not confined to judges of superior courts. A

justice of the peace in deciding to grant a search warrant is performing a
judicial function" 63 and, accordingly, should be provided with the same
protection. The Court went on to say that it did "not wish however, to
be thought in any way to accept the proposition that a justice of the
peace is compellable, or even competent, to testify as to his mental
processes in deciding to grant the warrant." 64 Although these comments
were obiter in Moran, they have been followed in subsequent cases. 65 It
appears, therefore, that there is no way to prove that a justice of the
peace did actually consider Cory J.'s factors and, accordingly, the
standard set out by the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada is
unworkable.

61

ibi. at 85.

62 (1988), 66 Sask. P. 268 (C.A.).
63 (1987), 21 O.A.C. 257 at 269 (C.A.).
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65 See R. v. Voss (1989), 33 O.A.C. 190 (C.A.); R. v. T. (21 November 1989), Doe. No. CA
942/88 (Ont. CA); and R v. Doucette (1990), 49 C.R.R. 177 (Ont. Dist. Ct.).
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Beyond the fact that it is virtually impossible to police the
discretion given to justices of the peace when issuing search warrants,
closer examination of Cory J.'s factors reveals that they do not add
anything significant to the existing standard of reasonableness. They
provide little, if any, special protection for the press against search and
seizure. Factors one through four and seven through nine are nothing
new. These criteria must be taken into consideration in the warrant
issuing process in any event. 66 Thus, the only new points introduced by
Cory J.are factors five and six. Factor five requires a justice of the
peace to consider whether there are alternative sources from which the
information could be obtained. A finding that no alternative sources
exist, however, is in Cory J.'s own words "not constitutionally required" 67
for the issuance of a search warrant. This factor does not raise the
constitutional standard for the press, but is merely another consideration
that a justice of the peace can use in the exercise of his or her discretion.
Indeed, in Lessard, there was no discussion of whether alternative
sources exist, yet Cory J.upheld the issuance of the warrant.6
Factor six, which requires a justice of the peace to consider
whether the information has been disseminated by the media to the
public, appears to be the most important factor to Cory J. He stated that
the "crucial factor" in deciding whether the issuance of the warrant in
Lessard was reasonable was the fact that the media had already
broadcasted portions of the video tape. Since the information had
passed to the public domain, Cory J.concluded that "the media had
already completed their basic function of news gathering and news
dissemination; thus ...
the seizure of the tapes ...
could not be said to
have a chilling effect on the media's sources of news." 69
The proposition that, if portions of the information have been
transmitted to the public it is acceptable to search and seize the
information, is tenuous at best. As McLachlin J.(dissenting) pointed
out in Lessard, "the fact that a portion of the material seized may have
been published [does not] negate the fact that other portions adversely
affecting the privacy of press informants may be disclosed as a
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consequence of the search." 70 The press might have consciously edited
out portions that revealed confidential sources before transmitting the
information to the public. By allowing the whole of the information to
be searched and seized, these sources will be revealed. If Cory J. had
limited the search and seizure to transmitted material, his argument
would be much stronger. Instead, he held that if any portion of the
material was transmitted to the public, the whole of the material can be
seized. Thus, a promise of confidentiality (and editing processes to
protect that promise) are rendered ineffective and meaningless.
Moreover, Cory J.'s test ignores the main problem that future
sources will be reluctant to come forward. If it becomes obvious that the
police can seize material if any portion has been disseminated to the
public, sources will refuse to come forward because there is no way to
protect their confidentiality: "[lt is the prospect of seizure of press
material in future cases without the imposition of conditions to protect
press freedom and the identity of informants which created the chilling
effect."71
Further, Cory J.'s test focuses solely on the danger to
confidential sources and to the news gathering function that is
dependant upon confidential sources. He failed to acknowledge that by
allowing material to be searched and seized merely because portions of
it were broadcast to the public, other functions of the press will be
affected. The editing function, for example, will be greatly affected. In
Lessard, Cory J. stated that the fact that media had broadcast portions of
the video tape, "is something that favours the issuing of a search
warrant." 72 This sends a message to editors that if they choose to
publish any portion of a story or film a justice of the peace will almost
automatically issue a search warrant on request. This is undeniably a
hindrance to freedom of the press.
Allowing searches to proceed against the press because
information has been published will not only affect the choice to publish,
but will also affect the choice of how to publish. For example, editors
might be forced to publish all of their material in a single issue rather
than in a series of stories due to the risk of seizure of the material
remaining after the first few installments. 73

70 Ibid. at 453.
71 kid.
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The distinction between untransmitted and transmitted material
as a basis on which to issue a search warrant does not protect
confidential sources and will interfere with the freedom of the press to
edit and disseminate news. The press must have the freedom to decide
what stories to print and how to print them without having to worry
about the consequences that the act of publishing will have on
unpublished but related material.
B. Third PartyNonsuspects
Perhaps the root of the hesitation on the part of the Supreme
Court of Canada and the United States Supreme Court to extend a
higher degree of protection to the press against search and seizure is the
holding of both Courts that the press is merely an innocent third party in
possession of information that could aid the police in investigating a
crime. In Zurcher,White J. stated that:
the issue here is how the Fourth Amendment is to be construed and applied to the "third
party" search ... where state authorities have probable cause to believe that ... evidence
of a crime is located on identified property but do not have probable cause to believe that
the owner or possessor of the property is himself implicated in the crime. 74

In Lessard, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. stated that "the sole issue in the
case concerns the right of the police to obtain a warrant to search the
premises of an innocent third party ... in order to obtain evidence of the
commission of a crime."7 5 Although Cory J. acknowledged that the
media is entitled to special consideration because of the importance of
its role in a democratic society, by not accepting cBc's section 2(b)
arguments against searches of the press and by not creating a unique
standard for the press, he "necessarily classifie[d] the press as a simple
third party nonsuspect."7 6 Indeed, Cory J. even stated that the press is
"truly an innocent third party .... [and] [t]his is a particularly important
factor to be considered." 77 The Court's rejection of the press's argument
that section 2(b), or that the First Amendment in the United States,
presents additional factors that justify elevating the standard of
reasonableness for the press above the standard in place for third
parties.
74
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If, however, the courts are correct in assuming that the press is
merely an innocent third party, then the press should not be afforded
greater protection from search and seizure than ordinary citizens
because nonsuspects should not be afforded greater protection than
suspects. Although one could argue that third parties should be entitled
to a higher standard of protection (because they are not alleged to have
done anything wrong), there are several reasons why it would be
impossible to create a higher standard of reasonableness to be applied in
situations where there is no nexus between the crime and the
owner/occupant of the premise to be searched. First, to determine if the
issuance of a warrant is reasonable, one must look to the requirements
in section 487 of the CriminalCode. This section states that if there are
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence relating to an offence will be
found in a certain location, then a warrant may be issued: "[t]he 'critical'
element of a reasonable search was whether probable cause [existed] for
believing that the evidence to be seized [was] located at the place to be
searched."78 Thus, "[tihe culpability of the owner or possessor of the
evidence is ...
immaterial in the context of a [section 8] search." 79 If

suspicion of the owner was required as an element of probable cause to
search, there would be little difference between a search warrant and a
warrant to arrest. If the police could show reasonable grounds to believe
that the owner or possessor of the evidence was implicated in the crime
they would have grounds to arrest the individual. The courts were
correct in concluding that the legality of a search is not dependent on
proving that the possessor of information is implicated in the crime.
Creating a higher standard of protection for third parties would
also undermine police investigations. Search warrants are often used in
the early stages of an investigation before the police have identified any
suspects. Indeed, the search is often used as a tool to obtain evidence
that enables the police to identify suspects. If a standard was created
that made it very difficult for police to obtain warrants against third
parties, police might not be able to identify suspects. There is also
always the possibility that the party who claims to be an innocent
nonsuspect may, in fact, turn out to be involved in the crime or be
sympathetic to the guilty party and hide or destroy the evidence.
Similarly, there is the practical problem that in order to obtain a search
warrant needed to gather evidence to identify suspects, the police would

78 Schiffrin, supra note 15 at 127.
79
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have to show that the possessor of the evidence was a suspect in the
crime. This, of course, would be impossible.
Another strong argument against creating a higher standard of
protection for third parties is that it would undermine one of the central
tenets of our criminal justice system. Section 11(d) of the Charter
guarantees that every individual is presumed innocent until proven
guilty. Simply because the police say that someone might be a suspect in
a criminal investigation is no reason to afford that person a lesser right
to privacy and individual dignity than a nonsuspect. Liebman, in
particular, has commented:
The privacy interests of individuals should not rise or fall according to the allegations of
police. The presumption of innocence is too central to our judicial tradition to allow
room for varying levels of privacy rights based on allegations of criminality, no matter
how intuitively appealing that notion may be. 80

The Supreme Court of Canada and the United States Supreme
Court were correct in concluding that section 8 of the Charterand that
the Fourth Amendment,81 respectively, cannot provide special
protection for the press as a third party nonsuspect. The press, however,
is not merely an innocent third party. The role that the press plays in
society differentiates it from almost all other parties.
In Lessard, McLachlin J. (dissenting) recognized that the press is
unique. She stated that "the history of freedom of press in Canada
belies the notion the press can be treated like other citizens or legal
entities when its activities come into conflict with the state."82 Even in
the United Kingdom, where there is no comparable protection provided
for the press, the courts recognize that "there is the special position of
the journalist or reporter who gathers news of public concern. The
83
courts respect his work and will not hamper it more than is necessary."
Moreover, in Canada the courts concluded that the press is unique and
deserving of special protection from search and seizure before the
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Charterwas put into place 4 Surely the "position of the press can be no
less privileged under the Charter."85
It must be noted, however, that many people do not think that
the press, as an institution, deserves Special or different treatment than
ordinary citizens. In Moysa v.Alberta (LabourRelations Board), the trial
court suggested that "freedom of the press is simply a kind of intellectual
freedom which one is entitled to exercise in relation to his thoughts, his
beliefs, his opinions and his expressions"86 and should not be seen to
impart a separate right to the press as an entity. In Re Canada Post Co.
and CanadianUnion of Postal Workers (Varma), K.P. Swan stated that
section 2(b) "should be seen as a broad right to intellectual freedom, and
'87
not as a special concession to any class of individuals.
Although it may be accepted that freedom of the press is a
constitutional guarantee that protects everyone's intellectual freedom, it
cannot be denied that:
An informed public depends on accurate and effective reporting by the news media. No
individual can obtain for himself the information needed for intelligent discharge of his

political responsibilities. For most citizens the prospect of personal familiarity with
newsworthy events is hopelessly unrealistic. In seeking out the news the press therefore

acts as an agent of the public at large ...
[and] performs a crucial function in effecting the
societal purpose of [section 2(b)]. 8 8

Where the press is faced with a search and seizure, its section
2(b) rights and, consequently, the section 2(b) rights of every individual
for which the press acts as an agent, are threatened. Thus, in
heightening the protection from search and seizure for the press, we are
actually heightening the protection of section 2(b) rights of all
individuals. Without a protected institutionalized way of gaining access
to information, the right of freedom of the press afforded to individuals
would be meaningless.
The press cannot only be differentiated from ordinary third
parties because of the fundamental role that it plays in society, but also
because of the relationship involved between the press and the police.
84
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As discussed in Part V, above, there is a strong perception that the press
and the police have a mutual dislike and distrust of one another.
Accordingly, the press is not in the same position vis--vis the police as
ordinary nonsuspects are. The police may appear to have a vendetta
against the press8 9 and the press has a vested interest in trying to keep
information in its possession away from the police (i.e., to protect
confidential sources, editorial policy, and so on). On the other hand, in
most cases the police do not have any vendetta against members of the
general public and members of the public are generally willing to help
the police if it will prevent crime or help convict criminals. The press
does not begin on the same footing that an ordinary third party does
when being searched because of the hostile relationship that exists
between the press and the police.
Another problem with focusing on the press as a third party, and
concluding that it does not, as such, deserve special protection, is that
the press should not be viewed as a type of person but as a type of
premise. Section 487 of the Criminal Code focuses on the location of a
search and not on the owner's culpability or identity. Canadian courts
have always accepted that different types of premises deserve differing
degrees of protection under section 8 depending on the level of
expectation of privacy associated with them. For instance, in Thomson
Newspapers,90 the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out that
commercial premises deserve less protection from search and seizure
because of the lower expectation of privacy associated with them. In R.
v. Thompson,91 the Court held that residences deserve heightened
protection from search and seizure. Sopinka J. stated that the police
must indicate on the face of the information submitted to obtain an
authorization to wiretap whether the location is a dwelling house and the
intentions of the police with respect to that home.92 If the justice of the
peace is not made aware that the location is a dwelling house, the
issuance of the warrant is considered unconstitutional.
In Thompson, the Court created a legal and constitutionally
heightened standard of protection for dwelling houses against wiretaps
because of the intense privacy interests surrounding the home. This case
provides a precedent for creating a constitutionally required higher
standard of protection for certain premises under section 8. If section 8
89
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can be elevated to provide heightened protection for the home, it can be
argued, similar to Liebman writing in the American context, that section
8 "should provide special protection from governmental intrusion for
those places where other fundamental freedoms-such as freedom of
the press-normally reside." 93
The press is not merely an innocent third party, as the courts
would have one believe. It has special interests that need to be
protected, it has a special relationship with the police that necessitates a
higher degree of protection from search and seizure, and the press, as a
location or premise which houses the fundamental freedom of the press,
should be protected.
94
VII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The Supreme Court of Canada has clearly rejected the possibility
of implementing a rule that requires police officers to list and investigate
all possible alternative sources from which the information sought could
be obtained before a search warrant can be issued. There are, however,
other possible routes the Court could have taken to ensure that a search
of the press would only be a last resort for police.
A. The Subpoena Duces Tecum
A subpoena duces tecum is an order of a court that requires an
individual to produce documents to be admitted as evidence in judicial
hearings. In Canada, unlike in the United States, a subpoena cannot be
issued for purely investigatory processes in criminal law. The Court in
Lessard,95 however, could have created an exception to this rule and
required that the police obtain a subpoena that ordered the press to
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produce the items sought. Only if the use of a subpoena is impractical,
as, for example, if the press refuses to voluntarily hand over the
information or if there is a danger that the press may destroy the items
rather than produce them, should a justice of the peace consider issuing
a search warrant.
This approach is more sensitive to the interests involved and
would provide more protection for the press in several ways. First,
although a search warrant must delineate the area that can be searched
and the items that can be seized, it has been opined that "there is simply
no conceivable way to search for a few documents in a room filled with
many, without doing precisely that."' 9 6 Searches for photographs or
writings "actually require the police to read and examine every
document until they have found either the ones specified in the warrant
or satisfied themselves that the evidence is not there." 97 Thus, the
Court's holding in Lessard that the concern that the police will rummage
through unrelated files and reveal confidential sources can "best be
addressed by limiting the warrant to specifically delineated items"98 is
entirely specious.
A subpoena, on the other hand, would allow the press sufficient
time to locate the material and to produce the items requested. This
would avoid an unannounced search that would needlessly expose
unrelated materials and the identities of confidential sources. In
addition, if the information requested would reveal the identity of a
confidential source, the press could choose whether to comply with the
order or to challenge it. In this way, a promise of confidentiality is
meaningful. In the case of an unannounced search, however, the police
simply barge in and rifle through material and the press cannot prevent
confidential sources from being revealed. Allowing the press the
opportunity to comply with an order to produce items would also avoid a
time consuming search that causes the physical disruption of the
institution and that delays or prevents timely publication of the news.
The subpoena process would also provide additional protection99
for the press because a subpoena can always be challenged on a motion
96
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to quash filed with the court before the sought-after materials are
produced. If the press did choose to challenge a subpoena, a court
would be forced to hear and re-evaluate evidence from the perspective
of the press before any violation of rights occurs. In contrast, the search
warrant procedure is an exparte hearing in which the justice of the peace
only hears the arguments put forth by the police and "once the warrant
is issued, nothing can restrain its operation until it has overrun whatever
press interests stand in its way." 1°° The only remedy available to the
press for an invalid search is a motion to quash the warrant made after
the search has taken place and after the damage to press interests has
already occurred. The subpoena process, however, can prevent a
violation of section 8 and section 2(b) rights before it happens.
The subpoena process would not frustrate law enforcement
efforts because it would only be available in a limited number of cases.
The "overwhelming majority of search warrants are used in an attempt
to procure fruits, instrumentalities of a crime or contraband."1 01 This is
the very type of evidence that would lead to the inference that the
possessor is likely involved in the crime and is not a mere innocent
custodian of evidence. If the party was a suspect in the crime under
investigation, a subpoena would be impractical because it would provide
warning to the suspect, who might then destroy the evidence before the
police could find it. Thus, a justice of the peace in the first instance
would be justified in issuing a search warrant instead of going through
the subpoena process. "Since, therefore, only evidence in the form of
documents, photographs, and the like could even raise the possibility
that a subpoenawould be required, it is difficult to subscribe to the ...
(majority's) ... conclusion that law enforcement efforts"102 would be
impeded.
Finally, newspapers are not likely to conceal evidence when
presented with a subpoena. The press might protest if the identities of
confidential sources were at stake, but it would likely comply with an
order for production because it would be in its best interests to do so. If
the press began destroying evidence as soon as it was presented with a
subpoena, justices of the peace would begin to accept claims of the police
regarding the impracticality of issuing subpoenas and would tend to
issue search warrants if the slightest question arose. The media's
"contemptuous disregard of subpoenas, [therefore], would serve only to
100
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undermine their own best interests by increasing the chances that future
evidence would be secured through searches."10 3 Thus, the use of the
subpoena acts in everyone's best interests; the police will obtain the
evidence they require and the press can avoid extensive searches of
unrelated material. The press would only refuse to comply and
challenge the subpoena in serious situations, in which case the courts
should be forced to hear and consider their arguments carefully.
Although the subpoena process appears to be more protective of
press interests than the search warrant process, there are several
arguments that illustrate weaknesses in the use of subpoenas. Requiring
subpoenas to be issued before a search warrant can be obtained could
lead to negative effects on law enforcement. The Law Reform
Commission pointed out that "the decision to give an individual the
benefit of the doubt and to refrain from exercising a search power
involves a possible risk of losing the items sought." 104 Previous
experience has shown that media personnel often risk contempt citations
and incarceration rather than respond to a subpoena requiring them to
testify in court. In fact, one study indicated that in 96 per cent of all
cases journalists have chosen to accept contempt citations.1 05 There is,
therefore, reason to suspect that the media might choose to destroy
documents and photographs when presented with a subpoena duces
tecum ordering their production. Indeed, in Zurcher,10 6 The Stanford
Daily had a policy of destroying any documents that might aid the police
in an investigation. In addition, members of the media have publicly
admitted that they "do not provide such material or information on
demand. [They] do not willingly turn over reporters' notebooks to police
[and] have no intention of becoming professional witnesses or of
betraying confidences given to [them]."107 It appears that members of
the media might prefer to destroy the evidence sought and face
contempt charges rather than cooperate with a police officer bearing a
subpoena.
Another negative effect on law enforcement would be the time
involved if the press chose to challenge a subpoena. The time and money
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107 pj. O'Callaghan, "Comment" in P. Anisman & A.M. Linden, eds., The Media, The Courts
and The Charter(Toronto: Carswell, 1986) 293 at 299.
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spent litigating the issue of the subpoena'svalidity would only serve to
impede ongoing investigations.
The Law Reform Commission also argued that a subpoena is just
as coercive as a search. It pointed out that the coercive element of a
search is the assertion of state control over the objects sought 108 and,
since a subpoena duces tecum requires the item to be produced as
ordered, it is equally coercive. In addition, although a subpoena does not
involve the police entering private zones, it must be personally served by
a police officer. The mere presence of a uniformed officer at one's
doorstep can be highly coercive and induce the production of the items
requested. In fact, in the vast majority of non-residential searches the
police never need to go past the front door, since the items are turned
over on request. 109
A subpoena might even lead to harsher consequences than a
search does. In Thomson Newspapers, Wilson J. noted that when an
individual is compelled to produce documentary evidence, he or she
"may well produce evidence beyond that which the governmental
authorities had reasonable grounds to believe existed." 110 Thus, there
could be a greater invasion committed against the individual than was
deemed constitutionally permissible at the time the subpoena was issued.
Perhaps the strongest argument against the use of subpoenas in
criminal investigations is the fact that the drafters of the Constitution
and of the CriminalCode11z did not set out this special protection for the
press. In the United States, the Fourth Amendment "emerged largely in
response to governmental invasions of the press." 112 Accordingly, the
American framers appeared to have the press in mind when they were
creating the constitutional protection from -unreasonable search and
seizure, and it would seem that if the framers had intended to prohibit
searches of the press or had wished to create a higher standard of
reasonableness before the press could be searched, they would have so
stated. The wording of section 8 is very similar to the wording of the
American Fourth Amendment, illustrating that Canada at least
considered the American Constitution as a template. Both
constitutions, however, fail to set out special considerations for searches

108 PolicePowers, supranote 60 at 251.
109 Ibi.
1 10

Thomson Newspapers, supra note 11 at 494.

111 Supra note 6.
112 Durney, supra note 20 at 600.
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of media offices. The Canadian drafters obviously felt that the justice
system could guard against unreasonable searches of the press.
Moreover, the legislators have created special protection in
other sections of the Criminal Code. For example, section 186(1)(b)
states that an authorization to wiretap can only be given where a justice
of the peace is satisfied that other investigative procedures have been
tried and have failed, and other procedures are unlikely to succeed. The
fact that special protection and less restrictive options exist in other
sections speaks directly against the argument that these precautions
should be read into section 487 of the Criminal Code and section 8 of the
Charter,where they are not explicitly stated. It has been argued that:
When something is not specifically mentioned in the constitution this does not mean that
it is sanctioned in all its particulars.

The framers themselves recognized that as

conditions change, so must the law. It is doubtful that they foresaw the rise in importance
of confidential news sources, or the damage of chilling effects, but they left [section 8]
13
open enough to encompass them.

The more convincing approach, however, seems to be that
section 8
has itself struck the balance between privacy and public need, and there is no occasion or
justification for a court to revise the [section] and strike a new balance by denying the
search warrant in the circumstances present here and by insisting that the investigation
proceed by subpoena duces tecum, whether on the theory that the latter is a less intrusive

alternative, or otherwise.

114

Thus, only Parliament could impose a requirement that a
subpoena duces tecum be issued prior to a search warrant, since the
courts do not have the power to alter the existing statutes.
B. Video Versus Documents
In Lessard, La Forest J. (dissenting in part) set up a test that
distinguishes between photographs and reporters' personal notes,
contact lists, or interview recordings.1 15 The logic for this differentiation
is a belief that the chilling effect on news gathering is always present with
respect to video and photographs-for if one is captured on film
committing an offence there is a danger of being identified. The reason

113 Note, "Supreme Court Review: Fourth Amendment-Search Warrants and the Right to
Free Press" (1978) 69 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 528 at 535.

114 Cantrell, supra note 31 at 41, citing Zurcher,supra note 7 at 559.
115

Lessard, supra note 1 at 431-32.
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the press is taping the event is obviously to broadcast the film and,
absent a promise of confidentiality, the persons being filmed have no
reason to believe that photographs of them will not be published.
Accordingly, no extra protection should be afforded against search and
seizure of photographs or film taken by the press.
With respect to personal notes or contact lists, however, there is
a danger that allowing the police to gain access to these could hamper
the ability of the press to gather information. The persons interviewed
or providing information to reporters may have a reasonable expectation
that their identities will not be revealed. All alternative sources of
information, therefore, should be exhausted before the police can obtain
a search warrant for these materials.
La Forest J.'s test not only makes sense intuitively, but
acknowledges the regime set up in Hunter,116 which declares that section
8 is not a monolith. The reasonableness requirement in section 8 varies
according to context and the reasonable expectation of privacy found in
that context. Individuals have a reduced expectation of privacy when
they are conducting their actions in a public place. In fact, the police
could easily have been there to identify the perpetrators themselves.
Thus, the standard of reasonableness regarding a search of video film
made in a public forum should not be increased.
This analysis, however, should be taken one step further.
Although the individuals in a public place have a reduced expectation of
privacy, the press may have a heightened expectation of privacy with
respect to the control of the information contained on the film. In R. v.
Dyment,117 La Forest J. stated there are three types of privacy: spatial,
bodily, and informational. Informational privacy describes the right of
an individual to determine for himself or herself when, how, and to what
extent he or she will release personal information.118 It can be argued
that after the reporter makes the video tape it becomes the property of
that reporter and that he or she has an informational privacy interest in
it. An individual perpetrator caught on film forfeits his or her privacy
interest by conducting himself or herself in public, but the film of the
incident now belongs to members of the press. The press collected the
information and it now has a recognizable privacy interest in controlling
how, when, and to what extent it will release the information contained
on the video tapes. It is not the privacy interest of the persons captured
11 6 Supra note 10.
117 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417.
118 Ibid. at 428-30.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOi. 34 NO.

I

on film that should concern La Forest J., but the privacy interests of
journalists in controlling the dissemination of information that they now
own. Thus, while the persons captured on film might have a reduced
expectation of privacy and should be subjected to a lower threshold of
reasonableness, the press as the owner of the videotaped information
does not have such a reduced expectation of privacy regarding the films.
Consequently, the press should not be subjected to a lower standard of
reasonableness for photographs or video than the one that is applied in
the case of reporters' notes or contact lists.
La Forest J.'s test also has other defects. If, for example, it
became known that events captured on video tape were subjected to a
lower standard of reasonableness and could be searched and/or seized
more easily than written notes, individuals might be less willing to invite
the press to film events such as protests or demonstrations. This would
result in either the loss of sources of information for the press or in the
press becoming more secretive in its methods of gathering visual
information. These results illustrate that freedom of the press to gather
information has been impinged upon and negate La Forest J.'s argument
that individuals performing in front of a camera have a reduced privacy
interest. If the perpetrators are not aware that the press is filming them
because reporters have resorted to more secretive methods, La Forest
J.'s argument loses its poignancy.
The test also only focuses on the importance of confidential
sources and the likelihood of their disappearance if video tapes are
allowed to be seized. The judge ignores the impact that his decision will
have on other aspects of the press's functions, such as editorial policy. If
the press knows that video tapes or photographs could be searched and
seized easily, editors would begin questioning whether they should
broadcast footage in their possession for fear of showing the police that
the press is in possession of information regarding a particular incident.
It will inevitably lead to self-censorship or an alteration of how
information is presented to the public.
La Forest J.'s analysis is more sensitive to the need to protect
freedom of the press in a search and seizure situation than that of Cory
J.'s, and it does heighten protection for reporters' notes and
documentary evidence. But La Forest J.'s approach to video footage
and photographic evidence is not sufficiently sensitive to the privacy
interests that members of the press have in that information, or to
aspects of freedom of the press, such as editorial decision making. His

Search and Seizure of the Press

1996]

test is preferable to that of the majority in Lessard,119 but it still does not
provide sufficient protection for the press.
C. Execution Versus Issuance
The Law Reform Commission held the view that the problem
surrounding searches of the press is "really a sub-category of the general
dilemma regarding searches of unsuspected third parties" 120 and that the
press should be offered the same protection as an unsuspected party.
The Commission went on to say that what really differentiates an
unsuspected party from a suspected one is "the likelihood that in the
absence of forceful action by the police, the information in the hands of
the suspected parties sought may be lost." 121 Accordingly, the best place
to give additional protection to the unsuspected party is at the execution
stage of the warrant process where the methods of searching become
relevant. Unsuspected parties will not likely conceal or destroy the
evidence sought. Therefore, the police do not need to use the same
search methods as they do when searching the premises of a suspect.
While it is arguable that the press is merely an unsuspected third
party as discussed in Part IV, above, the suggestion that the press ought
to receive heightened protection at the execution stage does possess
some merit. Since freedom of the press is endangered by the physical
disruption of operations and by the exposure of confidential sources and
editorial policies that invariably take place during a search, it would
make sense to place conditions on the execution of the warrant such as
limiting the search to certain areas of the office and to certain items and
confining it to off-hours when the disruption will not prevent the
publication of the news. A limitation could also be placed on the police
such that they are only permitted to search if at least one editor is
present who could point out which items are confidential. The police
would then be required to place these items in sealed packages until a
hearing took place to determine if the seized material had been taken
legitimately. The courts could also require that the police request the
items at the door first and only if their request is denied could law
enforcement personnel enter and search press offices.

119

Supra note 1.

120

PolicePowers, supranote 60 at 259.

121 Ibid. at 252.
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There is judicial authority for requiring different methods of
search and seizure depending on the type of premises involved. In
Desc6teaux, a case which involved the search and seizure of a law firm,
Lamer J. (as he then was) noted that:
one does not enter a church in the same way as a lion's den, or a warehouse in the same
way as a lawyer's office. One does not search the premises of a third party who is not
alleged to have participated in the commission of a crime in the same way as those of
someone who is the subject of such an allegation. 122

This appears to create a regime in which the nature of the
premises to be searched is relevant when deciding upon the manner in
which a search is to be conducted. The approach has also been followed
in the United States in the case of Roaden v. Kentucky, where the
Supreme Court noted that the methods of a "seizure reasonable as to
one type of material in one setting may be unreasonable in a different
setting or with respect to a different kind of material." 123 L'HeureuxDub6 J. in Lessard accepted this regime by stating that:
conditions can be imposed by a justice of the peace as to the manner in which a warrant
can be executed and, in that regard, particular considerations for the media are quite
relevant, such as the hours during which the normal media operations would be less
disturbed, the areas of the search and so on. 124

Another factor that should be considered here is the relationship
between the police and the press. It is not inconceivable, given the
hostile feelings of the police towards the press, that once inside press
offices the police may begin to vent their frustrations in the methods
they use to search the premises. It is at the execution stage that the clash
between two long-time foes really takes place and, consequently, it is at
the execution stage that heightened protection for the press would be
most effective.
The problem with the approach of creating higher standards of
reasonableness for the press at the execution stage is that each justice of
the peace could decide to impose different conditions on the methods of
search. Unless a list of required conditions was created, all the problems
of judicial discretion discussed earlier come back to haunt the process.
As Jacques J.A. stated in the Quebec Court of Appeal in Radio-Canada,
"[o]ne would risk a multitude of 'laws' which, by the very nature of
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123 413 U.S. 496 at 501 (1973).
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things, would be in large part contradictory."1 25 A standard procedure
for all searches of the press must be created by Parliament and be
applied in all situations.
D. Legislative Response
Both the subpoena duces tecum and the execution method
alternatives require that Parliament step in and alter the existing
standard of reasonableness in section 8 with respect to the press. In the
United States the legislatures have created a unified and heightened
standard for police searches of the press. After the United States
Supreme Court decided in Zurcher126 that the press did not deserve
heightened protection within the Fourth Amendment, the legislatures
reacted to the potential danger to freedom of the press by enacting
protective statutes. Congress, for example, enacted the Privacy
ProtectionAct of 1980,127 which prohibits (in the context of interstate and
foreign commerce) the search and seizure of media "work product
materials" 128 and "documentary materials" 129 in connection with the
investigation or prosecution of a criminal offence, with a few notable
exceptions. Those include where the possessor of the materials is
implicated in the crime, where the seizure is necessary to prevent death
or bodily injury, where there is reason to believe that the possessor
would destroy the evidence if supplied with a subpoena duces tecum, or
where such a document has been served and not complied with and all
challenges to the subpoena have been exhausted.
This legislative approach protects the interests of the press by
creating a "bright line" rule to guide justices of the peace. In the United
States, it is no longer left solely to the discretion of a magistrate whether
to issue a search warrant against the press at the request of federal law
enforcement. The legislation also embodies a least restrictive approach
that requires a subpoena duces tecum to be issued first. Only where a
subpoena proves ineffective, or where there is a danger of bodily harm or
destruction of the items sought, can a search warrant be issued in the
first instance. As discussed earlier, the main difficulty with a court
12 5 Supra note 30 at 2046.
12 6

Supra note 7.

127 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1988) [hereinafter Privacy ProtectionAct].
128 Ibid. § 2000aa(a).
129 Ibitt § 2000aa(b).
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concluding that a subpoena duces tecum must be issued before a search
warrant can validly be issued is that the drafters of the Constitution and
the Criminal Code did not set out this special protection for the press in
the text of the legislation. It is, therefore, the responsibility of
Parliament, and not the courts, to correct or alter the situation. This is
exactly what has been done, to a degree, in the United States.
The PrivacyProtectionAct strikes a sensible balance between the
need of the press to be free from unwarranted intrusions into private
materials and the need of law enforcement agencies to pursue all
possible leads in an attempt to identify culpable parties. The exceptions
in the Act regarding urgent situations allow a warrant to be issued
against the press only when absolutely necessary. TheAct acknowledges
the value of retaining an unfettered press and at the same time
recognizes the need of law enforcement agencies to obtain information
regarding crimes in order to protect the general public from harm.
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of Canada, in
Lessard, followed the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Zurcher, even though that decision has been effectively overturned by
legislation enacted by nine states 30° and by Congress. The Lessard
decision should be sending a message to Parliament that the appropriate
remedy lies in a legislative response: "[o]nly through the mechanism of
legislation can the proper balance be reinstated between the press and
law enforcement."131
VIII. THE POST-LESSARD SITUATION
The decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Lessard13 2 and
New Brunswick 33 are having, and will continue to have, a negative
impact on freedom of the press. In October 1992, a year after the two
decisions were released, for example, CBC, The Globe and Mail, and cry
brought an application to invalidate the seizure of unpublished video
tapes and photographs taken at a riot that occurred during an antiracism demonstration in downtown Toronto. Although there was no
130

As of 1992, the following states passed laws that, by varying degrees, limit the use of search
warrants against the press: California, Connecticut, Illinois, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon, Texas,
Washington, and Wisconsin. See RA Smolla, Free Speech InAn Open Society (New York: Vintage
Books, 1992) at 273.
131 Cantrell,supra note 31 at 52.
13 2

Supra note 1.
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information to indicate that those organizations were in possession of
crucial information or that the media was even present during the
crimes, a justice of the peace issued a warrant to search the media
premises. Moldaver J. upheld the issuance of the search warrants and
the seizure of the materialsj 3 4 This case demonstrates that Cory J.'s
nine-factor test has not had the effect of protecting the press from
unwarranted searches and seizures. In fact, Moldaver J. implicitly
dismissed Cory J.'s test, stating that the sole issue in the application
before him was whether the criteria in section 487 of the Criminal Code
were met. He stated that:
in this regard, it matters not whether the place to be searched is a private dwelling or a

business. As for media premises, while the Supreme Court of Canada has given
considerable guidance regarding additional factors and criteria which the justice ought to

consider before issuing a search warrant, compliance with the provisions of s. 487(1)(b)
13 5
remains essential.

This is the only mention that was made of Cory J.'s test;
Moldaver J. focused instead on section 487(1)(b) of the Criminal Code,
assuming that the test to be met for the issuance of a search warrant
against the press is simply the "reasonable grounds" requirement set out
in the section.
This case also provides support for the idea that justices of the
peace continue to issue search warrants for "fishing expeditions" in
newsrooms and that Ontario courts continue to sanction the ensuing
invasions on freedom of the press. Here, both the Crown and the
13 6
applicants "conceded the factual deficiencies in the information"
sworn to obtain the search warrant, and the judge even stated that "the
evidence presented to the issuing judge amounted to nothing more than
speculation."137 Moldaver J., however, validated the search and seizure
on the basis that the section should be read as simply requiring that the
materials sought might afford evidence with respect to the commission of
an offence. This is a remarkable extension of the words of the Criminal
Code, which require reasonable grounds to believe the items sought will
afford evidence with respect to the commission of an offence.
Moldaver J. also implicitly extended Cory J.'s test with respect to
media materials that are unpublished. In this case, none of the
134 R. v. CanadianBroadcastingCorp. (1992), 77 C.C.C. (3d) 341 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.))
[hereinafter cC 1992], affd (1993), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 574 (C.A.).

135 Ibid. at 347.
136 ibid. at 350.
137bi.
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applicants had published photographs. The police merely assumed that
the news organizations had evidence because other newspapers and
media operations had published relevant information. This case,
therefore, establishes that if any media operation has published
information, search warrants can be issued to seize material from other
media offices that have not published information upon the mere
suspicion that the second offices might have relevant information.
The case also demonstrates that Cory J.'s test in Lessard has not
provided extra protection for the press against search and seizure. In
fact, it represents an unsurpassed low in the fight against police invasions
of press facilities. Obviously Cory J.'s reliance on the discretion of
justices of the peace was misplaced and what is required is a firm rule
spelling out exactly when a search warrant may be issued against the
press. The only viable solution appears to be for Parliament to step in,
as Congress did in the United States, and correct the problems that the
court refused to address adequately in Lessard.
IX. CONCLUSION
The majority decisions in Lessard and New Brunswick have
fashioned a construction of section 8 that relies on the discretion of
justices of the peace and denies the regime set out in Hunter,138 which
required the standard of "reasonableness" in section 8 to vary according
to the context and interests involved in any situation: "[i]f probable
cause to search always overcomes a recognized privacy right regardless
of the type of evidence, crime, or privacy right involved, then
'reasonableness' has been effectively ousted as the touchstone of"
13 9
section 8 of the Charter.
No argument is being made to immunize the press from all
searches and seizures, but merely to control the means by which police
officers are permitted to obtain the information sought. Parliament
should step in and require that a subpoena duces tecum be issued, and
only where compliance with the subpoena is refused or where there is a
threat of bodily harm or destruction of the evidence should a search
warrant be issued against press operations. This approach would
balance the interests of the press in privacy and freedom to gather, edit,
and disseminate news as against the interests of law enforcement to
prevent or detect crime.
138
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The Lessard and New Brunswick cases have created a situation,
as demonstrated by the cBc 1992 case, 140 in which the police are able to
use their powers of search and seizure to interfere with the privacy and
freedom of the press. The courts justify this invasion and limitation on
freedom of the press by stating that the interests of the state in law
enforcement outweigh the needs of the press to freedom. The most
troubling aspect of these decisions is, however, that "small restrictions
[on freedom] accumulate into large restrictions, and in the process, may
become as habitual as, before, freedom was. Restrictions justified as
necessary safeguards of the freedom [of society to be protected from
crime] may in fact safeguard freedom out of existence altogether. 141 If
the courts are allowed to pick away at the constitutionally protected
freedom of the press, even in the slightest way, Canadians may become
habituated to the slow decline of our freedoms and will eventually be
coaxed into giving them up entirely.

140

Supra note 134.

141 R. v. Landry, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 145 at 188, La Forest J.,citing A. Maloney, "Law
Enforcement and the Citizen's Liberty" (1966) 9 Can. Bar. J. 168 at 170.

